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subject to attack either directly or collaterally 1 25 in a subsequent
action even though res judicata would otherwise be a defense.
While this is true as a general rule, if the lack of jurisdiction
is specifically put into issue in the first action, the court's deter-
mination of its own jurisdiction is conclusive. In this case, the
court's finding can be attacked by direct appeal, but not by col-
lateral attack.1 2
6
Friedman v. State ' 27 is an illustration of this proposition. In
Friedman, the claimant, a removed supreme court justice, sought
to recover back salary, contending that the Court on the Judiciary
was incompetent to remove him because it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. The Court of Claims held that while the claim was
ostensibly an action at law for accrued salary, it was, in actuality,
a collateral attack upon the jurisdiction of the Court on the
judiciary. Since Friedman had litigated the issue of that court's
jurisdiction while before it, his proper remedy was by direct appeal
to the Court of Appeals. No direct appeal having been taken,
the doctrine of res judicata precluded an exercise of jurisdiction
by the Court of Claims, thus forcing a dismissal of the claim.
Collateral estoppel: Defensive use of doctrine in derivative
liability case.
The doctrine of mutuality of estoppel provides that since non-
parties and non-privies are not bound by a judgment, normally
they cannot attempt to benefit therefrom . 2  Recent years have
seen a gradual erosion of the doctrine. Frequently, persons who
were not parties or privies to a prior litigation have been per-
mitted to assert the prior judgment as res judicata against an
adversary, even though they would not have been bound had the
prior result been to the contrary.' 29  The original exceptions to
the doctrine of mutuality were found in derivative liability cases
involving suits brought against the absentee owners of automobiles
to recover for the alleged negligence of their operators. 2 0 At
first, these owners, whose liability was derived from their opera-
tor's conduct, were allowed to rely on the doctrine of collateral
estoppel defensively. 13' More recently, the Court of Appeals has
allowed the offensive use of collateral estoppel in these derivative
125 Id. If 301.02.
126 5 id. I 5011.16, 5011.43.
127 53 Misc. 2d 955, 278 N.Y.S.Zd 999 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
12 8 WACHTELL, NEw YORK PRACTICE UxDER THE CPLR 347 (2d ed. 1966).
129See, e.g., Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 118-120, 134
N.E.2d 97, 98-100, 151 N.Y.S2d 1, 3-5 (1956).0 WACHTELL, supra note 128, at 348.
'3'See, e.g., Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9
N.E.2d 758 (1937).
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liability cases, and has taken the occasion to declare that the doc-
trine of mutuality is a "dead letter." 132
The recent case of Planty v. Potter-DeWitt Corp. 33 illustrates
the use of defensive collateral estoppel in a derivative liability case.
The plaintiff was injured when his automobile left a road being
re-constructed by the defendant under contract with the State.
Plaintiff instituted suit against the State, but his action was dis-
missed for failure to prove negligence and for failure to establish
his own freedom from contributory negligence. In plaintiff's
subsequent action against the defendant contractor, his complaint
was dismissed on the ground that "since the State's liability was
derived from its nondelegable responsibility to maintain its high-
way in a safe condition . . . [plaintiff] has had his day in court
on the very issue he seeks to litigate in the present suit and is
thus precluded by res judicata to litigate the question anew. .. ," '14
Collateral estoppel: DeWitt principle extended to fellow passenger
situation.
In B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 35 discussed in a recent edition
of the Survey,'36 the Court of Appeals allowed the offensive use
of collateral estoppel. The Court posited two requirements. First,
it must be unquestioned that the original action had been vigorously
defended, and second, the later cause of action must be derivative
of the first cause of action. Although the Court did not explicitly
define what it meant by a derivative action, it was assumed by
the editors of the Survey that a close relationship between the
initial and succeeding plaintiff, such as the owner-operator relation-
ship, was meant. However, the question was posed as to whether
the Court would have considered a passenger's relationship to the
driver as a sufficient nexus. It was felt that to answer in the
affirmative would be, logically, to extend the offensive use of
132B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147, 225 N.E.2d 195, 198,
278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 601 (1967).
13327 App. Div. 2d 401, 279 N.Y.S.2d 933 (3d Dep't 1967).
134 Planty v. Potter-DeWitt Corp., 27 App. Div. 2d at 402, 279 N.Y.S.2d
at 939.
'35 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967). In DeWitt
the defendant's jeep had collided with a vehicle owned by the plaintiff and
driven by one Farnum. Farnum was successful in a suit for personal in-juries and recovered $5,000. Subsequently, plaintiff sued for property dam-
ages of $8,500 and was granted summary judgment upon the ground that the
judgment in Farnum's suit was res judicata of the issues, with the excep-
tion of damages.
136 The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv.
128, 150 (1967).
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